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Unusual “Politics as Usual”: The 2017 Ballot 
Proposition Calling for a Constitutional 
Convention in New York 
 
By Peter J Galie* 
 
I. Achieving Constitutional Reform 
 
“A Convention will be Politics as Usual” 
- New York State AFL-CIO COPE Department 
 
The first task of constitutional reformers is to make the 
people of the state aware that they live under a constitution that, 
for better or worse, affects their everyday lives whether they live 
on in remotes sections of the Adirondacks routes in villages or a 
teeming megalopolis.  Until this is done, the people are not likely 
to demand or even accept the more thoroughgoing revision so 
badly needed in New York. 
To do so is to engage in civic education of the highest order.  
Care of the constitution goes to the heart and soul of our polity.  
That task is made difficult for the following reasons: 
4 It rarely engages voter attention: the “winner” in most 
constitutional convention (commonly referred to as “con-
con”) votes is the non-voter.1 
 
 
 
 
 
*  Professor Emeritus, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY.  He is the author of 
ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK (1996), co-author 
of THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2012) with 
Christopher Bopst, and co-editor of NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE PATH TO RENEWED GREATNESS (2016) with 
Christopher Bopst and Gerald Benjamin. 
1. See HENRIK N. DULLEA, CHARTER REVISION IN THE EMPIRE STATE: THE 
POLITICS OF NEW YORK’S 1967 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 31, 71 (1997); 
Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Question 
Referendum: The New York Experience in National Context, 65 ALB. L. REV. 
1017, 1047 (2002). 
1
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 Vote on Calling a Constitutional Convention 
 1936 1965 1997 
For 1,413,604 1,681,438 929,415 
Against 1,190,275 1,468, 431 1,579,390 
Blank   2,915,081 2,948,332 1,693,788 
 
4 It requires changes to a document that is obscure, 
difficult to comprehend, and about which voters are 
largely ignorant.2 
4 It requires knowledge of issues that are not immediately 
understandable or that enable voters to see a direct 
connection between the state’s problems and proposed 
reforms.3 
II. Politics as Usual 
 
When we move beyond problems related to information 
levels and participation rates, we come to an issue that has been 
a major stumbling block to successful calls for a constitutional 
convention.  New Yorkers have a legitimate concern about 
politics as usual in the state, with the same three men sitting in 
a room making all major state decisions behind closed doors.4 
Opponents of a constitutional convention make the argument 
that the process for selecting delegates, which in part resembles 
the process by which legislators are chosen,5 will enable 
“insiders” to dominate a convention, creating a duplicate forum 
for inaction when we already have one in our legislature. 
 
2. For an analysis of the complexity, verbosity and arcane nature of much 
of the state’s constitution, see Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, 
Constitutional “Stuff”: House Cleaning the New York Constitution—Part I, 7 
ALB. L. REVIEW 1385 (2013). 
3. Id. at 1387-90. 
4. See Marc Santora, U.S. Attorney Criticizes Albany’s ‘Three Men in a 
Room’ Culture, NY TIMES (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/2
4/nyregion/us-attorney-preet-bharara-criticizes-albanys-three-men-in-a-room-
culture.html?mcubz=1&mtrref=www.google.com&assetType=nyt_now. 
5. If the convention call is approved in November 2017, delegates will be 
elected in November 2018.  See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.  Three delegates will 
be elected from each of the state’s sixty-three senate districts (for a total of 189) 
and fifteen delegates will be elected statewide (making a total of 204).  See id. 
(delegate selection process); N.Y. STATE LAW § 124 (McKinney 2014) 
(establishing the sixty-three Senate districts). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/3
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Why, they ask, should we expect anything better from a 
convention run by the “same old politicians?”  They say that 
today’s political climate would make any convention a waste of 
time and money that could be spent more productively.  I want 
to explore the criticisms leveled against holding a constitutional 
convention in more detail. 
The argument is as follows: a constitutional convention is so 
similar to a legislature in the way it operates as to make its 
efforts duplicative of the legislature. 
4 Structures and procedures are similar; 
4 Parties will organize the convention; 
4 Rules of procedure are similar to those employed by the 
legislature: committees, floor debates & proposals that 
will be voted on by a majority of the delegates; 
4 Membership overlaps with legislature; 
4 The convention will be dominated numerically by 
insiders, by virtue of the experience of the delegates 
elected: current or former legislators, judge and party 
officials.  That has been the experience of past 
conventions; and 
4 Past conventions produced more of the same or so little 
that they were a waste of time and money.6 
III. Why a Convention is Different Than a Legislature 
 
The argument presented above is that a convention is 
similar to a legislature in the way it operates, making its efforts 
duplicative of the legislature.  There are, however, important 
differences between the state legislature and a constitutional 
convention.  A constitutional convention: 
 
6. See, e.g., Ross Barkan, New York is About to Vote on a Constitutional 
Convention: Here’s Why You Should Care, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/08/31/new-york-is-about-to-vote-on-a-
constitutional-convention-heres-why-you-should-care/ (discussing arguments 
for and against a constitutional convention); Michael Gormley, New York 
Constitutional Convention Vote Raises Hopes, Fear, NEWSDAY (Aug. 26, 2017), 
http://www.newsday.com/news/region-state/new-york-constitutional-
convention-vote-raises-hopes-fears-1.14091435 (same). 
3
GALIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/17  9:53 PM 
2017 UNUSUAL “POLITICS AS USUAL” 31 
4 Is a unicameral body, so there is no need for passage by 
multiple houses and the attendant reconciliation 
required between the two houses;7 
4 Is autonomous and transitory because it is called for a 
specific purpose and goes out of existence when that 
purpose is accomplished.  This procedure frees delegates 
from the pressures of re-election campaigns; 
4 Does not use a seniority rule for the appointment of 
chairs and leadership; 
4 Allows judicial, executive, and local government officials 
to participate jointly in its deliberations.8  Officials are 
not separated into three branches as they are in state 
government; 
4 Limits the power of political leaders and parties.  
Convention officers do not have the political and legal 
influence that leaders of the state legislature wield.  
They cannot bury the proposals of maverick members in 
committees.  Future committee assignments cannot be 
promised, and no local project can be initiated or 
delayed.  As the leading scholar of the 1967 Convention 
writes about that event: “leadership was generally much 
more constrained than normally would have been the 
case in the legislature.”9 
4 Has no institutional memory.  Throughout New York’s 
history there have only been a handful of delegates that 
have attended multiple conventions.10  Nearly all of the 
delegates to a 2019 convention will be new to the game.  
No delegates will exert special influence because of their 
experience in a prior convention (last held fifty years 
ago);11 
4 Proposes only constitutional changes and focuses 
 
7. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1. 
8. There are no qualifications for who may serve as a delegate.  Id. art. 
XIX, § 2. 
9. DULLEA, supra note 1, at 9. 
10. Id. at 8 (noting only two participants of the 1967 Constitutional 
Convention previously served as delegates). 
11. Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/3
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exclusively on that task.  A convention engages in none 
of the other activities and exercises none of the 
responsibilities that are a part of the state legislature’s 
duties, such as adopting a budget and the day-to-day 
business of governing; 
4 Has less demanding procedures for constitutional 
revision than the ones imposed on the state legislature.  
Constitutional amendments in New York that are 
initiated by the legislature must pass two separately 
elected legislatures; a convention requires only single 
passage by that body.12 
4 Contains a mix of (senatorial) district and statewide 
delegates (there are fifteen delegates selected at large).13  
As opposed to a legislature, in which all members are 
representing local interests, a convention combines both 
local and statewide interests. 
These differences contradict claims about the similarities of the 
two deliberative bodies.  On the question, as to whether past 
conventions have produced meaningful reform, I submit the 
following proposition. 
 
IV. Past Conventions Have Been of Great Value in Creating Our 
Constitutional Tradition 
 
Convention opponents assert that previous conventions 
have been boondoggles: do-nothing-events that have squandered 
taxpayer money on partying while fattening up pensions but 
producing little or nothing of value. 
The best test of this claim is readily available: what did past 
conventions produce?  The conventions of 1821, 1846, 1894, and 
1938, all of whose work was approved in whole or in large part 
by the voters, had their share of sitting of former legislators and 
judges.14  Yet nearly every right and most of the important 
 
12. Compare N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (requiring a majority vote in both 
houses), with N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (requiring a majority vote by the 
convention delegates). 
13. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2. 
14. See DULLEA, supra note 1, at 18-20. 
5
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constitutional reforms that we now look at with pride were the 
products of these conventions.  Here is a partial list: 
4 The state bill of rights;15 
4 Environmental protections (the “forever wild” clause 
preventing state forest lands in the Adirondacks and the 
Catskills from being developed);16 
4 The education article, which has been interpreted to 
provide the right to a sound basic education;17 
4 The requirement that the state provide aid and care for 
its needy;18 
4 Provisions encouraging the state and municipalities to 
provide low-income housing for their most vulnerable 
residents;19 
4 A bill of rights for organized labor;20 
4 The state’s equal protection clause;21 
4 Constitutional protection for public employee pension 
benefits;22 and 
4 Protections against illegal searches and seizures.23 
The very constitutional protections opponents use to scare 
people from approving a constitutional convention happened 
because we held conventions!24  In the absence of conventions, 
would these cherished rights and policies be in the constitution?  
We wouldn’t bet on it.  Since the state’s founding, conventions 
 
15. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
16. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
17. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, §1-3. 
18. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. 
19. N.Y. CONST. art XVIII, §1-2. 
20. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 17. 
21. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
22. N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7. 
23. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12. 
24. See generally Nathan Tempey, Pandora’s Box or Reset Button? Unions, 
Activists Square Off Over Upcoming Constitutional Convention Vote, 
GOTHAMIST (June 6, 2017, 10:42 AM), http://gothamist.com/2017/06/06/ny_con
stitutional_convention.php (discussing concern of repealing previously 
discussed constitutional protections). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/3
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have had a much stronger record of creating and enhancing 
rights than the state legislature.25  Although we cannot predict 
what a convention will or won’t do, we have no evidence 
whatsoever to believe that a convention in 2019 would undo this 
strong tradition. 
Our last constitutional convention, held in 1967, continued 
the state’s tradition of providing additional rights.26  That 
convention proposed a new constitution (ultimately rejected by 
the voters)27 that included, among others, the following reforms: 
4 An independent redistricting commission;28 
4 Suffrage for those eighteen years or older;29 
4 A more equitable school funding formula;30 
4 Prohibition against discrimination based on sex, age, or 
handicap;31 
4 A constitutional provision protecting clean air and 
water;32 and 
4 Reducing the length of the document by fifty percent to 
twenty-six thousand words.33 
In the face of this evidence, we think it is difficult to contend 
that conventions have been do-nothing boondoggles.  
 
25. See Gerald Benjamin, “All of Nothing at All”: Changing the 
Constitution – The Reform Dilemma, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: 
THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE PATH TO RENEWED GREATNESS 285, 286 (Peter 
J. Galie, Christopher Bopst & Gerald Benjamin eds., 2016). 
26. See PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
NEW YORK 309-317 (1996). 
27. The constitution submitted by the 1967 convention, although forward 
looking in many respects, was rejected by voters.  Id. 324-27.  One of the main 
reasons for the proposed constitution’s defeat was the controversial repeal of 
the existing prohibition against the use of state funds for parochial schools.  Id. 
at 327 (referred to as the “Blaine” Amendment).  By submitting its work as a 
single, “take it or leave it” constitution, the 1967 Convention eschewed the 
prudent decision of the 1938 Convention to submit its work in nine separate 
proposals.  Id. at 325.  This proved to be a fatal mistake.  
28. See GALIE, supra note 26, at 314; DULLEA, supra note 1, at 204-206. 
29. See GALIE, supra note 26, at 314; DULLEA, supra note 1, at 182-83. 
30. See GALIE, supra note 26, at 317; DULLEA, supra note 1, at 288-89. 
31. See GALIE, supra note 26, at 310; DULLEA, supra note 1, at at 264. 
32. See GALIE, supra note 26, at 317; DULLEA, supra note 1, at 249-251. 
33. See GALIE, supra note 26, at 324. 
7
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Conventions have brought about remarkable transformations 
despite the inclusion of former politicians, legislators, and 
judges. 
 
V. Conventions Have Not Been Dominated by Political 
“Insiders” 
 
Contrary to popular misconceptions pushed by opponents of 
the constitutional convention, elected officials have not 
dominated past conventions.  Of the 186 delegates to the 1967 
convention, only 13 (seven percent) were sitting legislators, and 
19 (thirteen percent) were sitting judges—hardly dominant and 
nowhere near a majority.34  If we include former elected 
legislators and judges in our numbers, the total rises to sixty-six 
delegates, slightly more than one-third of the body.35 
There are good reasons, however, for not lumping together 
former and current elected officials.  If the claim is that a 
convention will not do anything differently than the legislature 
because it will be dominated by legislators, we would have to 
assume that former legislators—even though no longer subject 
to the rules, norms, and sanctions of that body, and not under 
any pressure to be re-elected—will, nonetheless, behave as if 
they were still legislators.  This argument strains credulity and 
common sense and does not comport with the actual behavior of 
legislators. 
Who has not observed the willingness of former legislators 
to speak out or take positions on issues that, while legislators—
subject to the constraints of party rules, legislative norms and 
the need to be re-elected—counseled silence?  Branding former 
legislators and judges as “insiders” without closer analysis 
 
34. See Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Change in New York State: 
Process and Issues, in MAKING A MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE PROSPECTS FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN NEW YORK 57, 66 (Rose Mary Bailly & Scott N. Fein 
eds., 2016) [hereinafter MAKING A MODERN CONSTITUTION]; see also Henrik N. 
Dullea, We the People, in MAKING A MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 34, at 
23, 30-31. 
35. See 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 9-106 (1967).  At the 1938 convention, seventy-three delegates 
(approximately forty-five percent) had either current or past state legislative 
or judicial experience. In 1967, the comparable figure was thirty-five percent, 
down ten percent. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/3
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papers over real differences, especially on the important issue of 
delegate independence. 
To our argument that legislators and judges, former and 
current, did not constitute a majority of the delegates, opponents 
might reply: “The term ‘insiders’ includes not just former and 
current elected officials, but also local politicians like mayors, 
county attorneys, supervisors, local legislators, and non-office 
holding political party leaders.”  Of course, broadening the 
categories of those termed “insiders” to include these additional 
categories, by definition, increases the number of “insiders” at a 
convention, but it also takes the sting out of the conclusion 
opponents have drawn from their presence.  Let’s locate each 
category of delegates in one of a series of five concentric circles: 
 
 
9
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The first three circles contain the “insiders,” broadly 
interpreted.  However, lumping these individuals together 
ignores crucial differences between them—differences that 
suggest much more diversity of opinion and independence than 
the homogenizing pejorative “insider” implies.  Should we label 
as insiders both a legislator who served one term and left 
because she thought she could promote legislative reform better 
from the outside and one who has been in the legislature for 
twenty-five years?  How helpful is that?  Would you put them in 
the same category? 
Ask yourself: Should a former judge with a sterling record 
and the admiration of the community be tainted with the label 
“insider?”  How about a former legislator who served with 
distinction?  Consider a judge who sat on a city court having 
retired thirty years prior to serving as a delegate.  Isn’t it likely 
that that judge will have perspectives and experiences quite 
different from a currently serving court of appeals judge?  Or 
consider a former governor or attorney general who, since 
retiring, has been an active member of a good government group 
like the League of Women Voters or Common Cause. 
Should we dismiss as “insiders” past or present local 
officials who have earned the trust and respect of their 
constituents?  Do we do them a disservice by labeling them with 
the presumptuous and denigrating label “insider?”  Is that label 
at all helpful?  Should we call such labeling by its proper name: 
propaganda? 
If there are delegates at future conventions who have 
distinguished themselves in public life and earned the esteem of 
the voters who chose them as delegates, should we fault the 
process for producing such results?  Would we want a convention 
filled with delegates who had no political experience or 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/3
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familiarity with decision-making in democratically organized 
forums?  Between the two ends of the spectrum—a convention 
dominated by current legislators, judges, and party leaders 
versus one dominated by political neophytes—there is a middle 
ground.  That middle ground is revealed by examining the 
background of the delegates to the 1967 convention: 
What is most striking about this list is that the largest 
number of delegates were in the public service category.36  These 
delegates were most notable for their public service, and not by 
extensive party leadership positions or elected office.37  They 
were individuals who had distinguished themselves as citizens. 
Even among the minority of sitting and former legislators, 
profound and significant differences existed. These delegates 
were from: 
4 Different parties (Democratic, Republican, Labor, 
Liberal); 
4 Different parts of the state (upstate, downstate, etc.); 
and 
4 Different courts (ranging from justice courts to the Court 
of Appeals).38 
Some former legislators and judges had been off the bench or out 
of legislative office for over a generation.  Most importantly, the 
individuals occupying each circle did not think alike on all or 
most of the issues at the conventions.  
Social science research, not to mention our daily 
experiences, recognize that the loyalties of men and women in 
public life are diverse.  Obtaining office under the label of a 
major party does not mean that person is in harmony with all 
those who likewise profess that label.  To assume that these 
demographic characteristics (age, race, religion, ethnic 
background, and life experiences) would not create a diversity of 
opinions is naïve, if not willfully ignorant. 
 
 
 
 
36. See 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 9-106 (1967).   
37. See id. 
38. DULLEA, supra note 1, at 117-118, 124-126. 
11
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VI. What Insiders Will Share 
 
What delegates with lengthy careers in public service and 
extensive political experience do share—and what we believe 
they would ensure—is that we will have a convention comprised 
of delegates who are: 
4 Familiar with our constitutional system of local, state, 
and national governments; and 
4 Committed to our constitutional values: the rule of law, 
an independent judiciary, a viable legislature, and the 
rights and policies New Yorkers cherish. 
Such delegates are the best defense against the charge that a 
convention will open Pandora’s Box and threaten our 
constitutional values.  When we move beyond the breezy 
cynicism of “the insider’s game” phrase, the argument falls of its 
own weight.  Let’s call this argument what it really is: an 
argument made by insiders! 
 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/3
